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STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
MAXIMILUAN ROBERTO SEALE, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
| Case No. 910010 
) Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's contemporaneous objection to the admission of the alleged 
victims' videotaped statements specifically raised the constitutional issue of right of 
confrontation and that issue has been properly preserved for appellate review. 
Further, Defendant's hearsay objection to the admission of statements 
allegedly made to Elizabeth Jones was specific and contemporaneous and that issue has 
likewise been preserved for appellate review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT ADEQUATELY PRESERVED A CONFRONTATION 
CHALLENGE TO THE ADMISSION OF THE VIDEOTAPED 
STATEMENTS. 
In Point II of its brief, the State argues that the Defendant did not make a 
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specific, contemporaneous objection which adequately raised, in the trial court, the 
Defendant's contention that the admission of the videotaped statements would deny him 
the right of confrontation. 
The State contends: 
Defendant's resistance at trial to the admission of the videotape was 
based solely on his view that the statement did not meet the 
statutory and rule requirement of reliability and trustworthiness 
[citations omitted]. If defendant had raised at trial the specific 
confrontation issue from Wright that he now raises on appeal, he 
would have given Judge Eves the chance to avoid a potential 
constitutional error that could result in reversal. 
Appellee's Brief at p. 30. 
In making his objection to the admission of the videotape, trial counsel 
stated: 
[BY MR. WINCHESTER] The interest of justice, in my opinion, would 
require this court to look at the reliability of the tape and weigh that 
against a defendant's constitutional right under both the United 
States Constitution and our state constitution to be able to cross-
examine witnesses. 
I can't cross-examine that videotape. I can't cross-examine the 
statements made therein. And as the court has now seen I think it 
would be futile to try to cross-examine [P.W.]. 
* * * 
That's the very predicament which Mr. Seale finds himself. If this 
court allows the tape to come in, he has no way of cross-examining 
the statements made on that tape. And I believe he's denied his 
constitutional right to face his witness - to face the accused and to 
cross-examine the witness. 
T 105-106. 
The trial court clearly understood the objection to have constitutional 
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dimensions including questions regarding the right of confrontation. 
[BY THE COURT] This is a troubling portion of our law. As you 
know, the statute is relatively new. The concept is sort of 
revolutionary. The idea that a defendant can be faced with 
conviction by a videotape and never have the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant in the videotape is a concept that although it's 
embodied in the statute still has to test the - or still has to fact the 
test of constitutionality. 
T 111. 
The State's contention that the Defendant failed to adequately raise the 
constitutional issue at the trial level is without merit. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE ALLEGED 
VICTIMS' PRIOR STATEMENTS MADE TO ELIZABETH JONES WAS 
SPECIFIC AND THE ISSUE HAS BEEN PROPERLY PRESERVED 
FOR APPELLATE REVIEW. 
When the prosecutor attempted to elicit testimony regarding out-of-court 
statements which J.W. and P.W. had allegedly made to Elizabeth Jones, defense counsel 
objected: 
[BY MR. WINCHESTER] Your honor, I'll object to statements made 
by the children on the same basis as the objection yesterday that 
regarded the social worker from Idaho. 
T176. 
On the preceding day, the prosecutor had attempted to elicit a hearsay 
statement from Mary Riggs, a social worker from Jerome, Idaho. Defense counsel 
specifically stated his objection: "Objection, your honor. I believe the response will be 
hearsay." (T117) 
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The trial court obviously understood the objection to Elizabeth Jones' 
testimony to be hearsay for in overruling the objection the court did so on the basis that 
the statements were "admissible as prior consistent statement, and therefore, it would be 
admissible for the truth of the matter asserted, the credibility of the victims having been 
questioned." (T 176) It cannot reasonably be argued that the trial court misunderstood 
the objection. 
"Hearsay" is not a "generic objection" as the State suggests. "Hearsay" is 
a specific objection. It draws the trial court's attention to the contention that the pending 
response will include out-of-court statements which the proponent offers in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Trial counsel is not obliged to identify each 
exception to the rule against hearsay or argue its inapplicability. 
The State's contention that trial counsel did not adequately identify the 
nature of Defendant's objection is without merit. 
The State further contends that any error arising out of the admission of 
Elizabeth Jones' testimony was harmless and in footnote 18 on page 48 of the Appellee's 
Brief, the State argues: 
In light of the evidence at trial, including the testimony of J.W. and 
the videotaped statement of P. W. and the unchallenged but similar 
prior statements to Dr. Sugden and their Aunt Cheryl in Idaho, 
defendant could not make the requisite showing that the alleged 
evidentiary error in admitting the statements to Elizabeth was 
harmful. 
In making this argument, the State overlooks several important facts. First, 
the statements made to Dr. Sugden and Cheryl Vanleishout were not spontaneous and 
were far removed in time from the statements allegedly made to Elizabeth Jones. 
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Second, the statements made to Dr. Sugden were made during the investigative stage 
of the proceedings and in no way relate to any offense allegedly committed against P.W. 
Finally, the statements allegedly made to Cheryl Vanleishout were not admitted to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted. In admitting this evidence the court instructed the jury: 
[BY THE COURT] Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I am going to 
allow the statement to stand and overrule the objection. But you 
need to understand that the statements that are being given now by 
this witness and which are being attributed to [J.W.] are not being 
introduced for the truth of the content of those statements. In other 
words, not to prove that what [J.W.] said was true, but rather to 
demonstrate that a complaint was made and the circumstances 
under which the complaint was made. 
T 138-139. 
The prejudice associated with the admission of statements allegedly made 
to Elizabeth Jones is manifest. First, the statement was admitted as a prior consistent 
statement of P.W. notwithstanding the fact that, at that point in the proceedings, P.W.'s 
videotaped statement had not been admitted into evidence and P.W. had made no in-
court accusation against the Defendant. 
Second, relating to J.W., the statement was admitted, not to rebut an 
express or an implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, but 
to reinforce J.W.'s testimony in light of mere contradiction provided through the testimony 
of one of the state's own witnesses, Alice Chapman. 
CONCLUSION 
The State's contentions that the Defendant failed to make specific and 
contemporaneous objections which preserved the constitutional and hearsay issues for 
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appellate review are without merit. 
DATED this j£_ day of July, 1991. 
an/W. G ry Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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